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This brings us to an important secondary point in this book. Grounded to the 
extent that he is in tradition, Schuon is so wary of innovations that he has 
heretofore been reluctant to grant Protestantism the status of a fully orthodox 
yana, or vehicle. Here, in an important chapter that focuses on Lutheranism but 
alludes to Calvin and Anglicanism in passing, he acknowledges that it is such. 
His reasons are in keeping with the ones he uses in simultaneously validating 
Christianity and Islam. Protestantism allows expression to spiritual propensities 
that Christianity had insufficiently provided for, ones which (to pursue the matter 
of ethnic types) the Germanic temperament probably houses disproportionately. 
Centering in an extreme consciousness of human limitations, one so acute that 
it totally despairs of man's power to meliorate them, Luther turned directly to 
God. Faith in God's power to effect a change is the human access to that change, 
so faith and faith alone-solo fide-is the key to the kingdom. The reformer in 
Luther should not be downplayed, but his destiny was to "gestalt" the components 
of a spiritual personality type that has its rights. In doing so, he accomplished 
for Christendom what his counterpart, the saint Shinran, effected for Japanese 
Buddhism. 
Returning to the primary theme of the book, its comparison of Christianity 
and Islam, there is not room to go into specifics, but I can add another word 
about the general drift through calling attention to the book's subtitle. Ecumenism 
is much in the air these days, but Schuon has been so critical of the venture that 
it is initially surprising to find the word appearing in one of his own titles. The 
explanation is to be found in the prefix "esoteric" which Schuon uses to distinguish 
his version of the enterprize. 
The mistake of ecumenism as it is typically practiced--exoteric ecumenism 
in Schuon's vocabulary-is that it tinkers with disparate theologies to try to 
make them compatible. This can only produce a theological mishmash that 
smacks more of committee compromises than of divine disclosure. It blurs 
identities, causing the life to go out of them. 
Esoteric ecumenism leaves existing theologies untouched. Instead, it cultivates 
a non-creedal stance that honors alternatives while tempering their exclusivism. 
It is like adding a third dimension to spiritual space. No two-dimensional photo-
graph [articulated theology] can do justice to a building's mass [the fullness of 
the divine Reality]. Yet even while circumambulating the building we can see 
that photographs faithfully represent it from their respective perspectives. 
Religious Experience, by Wayne Proudfoot. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1985. Pp. xix, 263. Cloth, n.p. 
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
Proudfoot'~ hook offers a sustained examination of modern attempts to ground 
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"religious belief and practice" in an "autonomous moment of human experience." 
The attempt begins with Schleiermacher, and is guided by three convictions. (1) 
Religious experience is pre-conceptual; it is the source of religious beliefs and 
concepts, not an artifact of them. (2) Religious consciousness is intentional. The 
subject seems to experience the Holy, or his absolute dependence on the "whence 
of all existence." (The experience's intentionality gives it its authority and makes 
it plausible to think that religious belief and practice grow from it.) (3) Since 
religion expresses an autonomous moment of human experience, one can't 
appropriately evaluate it in non-religious terms. Reductive descriptions or expla-
nations of religious experience distort it. 
Proudfoot thinks that "the program that Schleiermacher inaugurated" is fatally 
flawed. For one thing, the first two theses are inconsistent. Intentional experiences 
incorporate beliefs and concepts. Thus, the feeling of absolute dependence incor-
porates the belief that one is dependent on the whence of all existence. Experiences 
can't be both pre-conceptual and intentional. 
Nor is religion autonomous. Religious experiences incorporate explanatory 
hypotheses-viz., that they are produced by non-natural causes. Mystics, for 
example, claim to perceive God. Since "A perceives B" entails "B causes A's 
experience of B," they are implicitly asserting that their experiences have a 
non-natural origin. Because these embedded explanatory hypotheses are defeas-
ible, religious experience isn't immune to criticism. 
Proudfoot believes that religious apologists like Schleiermacher and D. Z. 
Phillips have failed to see this because they have confused descriptive and 
explanatory reduction. The first is indeed inappropriate. Actions and intentional 
experiences are partly constituted by the subject's concepts and beliefs and must 
therefore be described in terms available to him. Nevertheless, the investigator 
needn't accept the subject's explanations of his experience. A description of 
Teresa's experience which fails to point out that it seemed to her that she saw 
Christ abstracts from important features of her experience and thus misrepresents 
it. Her explanation of her experience, however, may be mistaken. Nothing is, 
in principle, inappropriate in attributing her experience to natural causes. 
Most of this seems to me correct or at least plausible. Proudfoot's other theses 
are more controversial. He believes that (1) the noetic quality of a religious 
experience should be identified with the embedded causal judgment and its 
affective resonance. This allegedly implies that (2) a religious experience has 
no intrinsic authority. The incorporated causal judgment is merely one hypothesis 
among others, and should be accepted only if it provides a better overall expla-
nation of the experience than its naturalistic competitors. (3) While the embedded 
hypotheses could be correct, they are in fact suspect. Religious experiences 
appear to be "artifacts" of the subject's religious or cultural tradition and not 
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products of non-natural causes. I find Proudfoot's defense of these contentions 
inadequate. 
What does he mean by a "noetic experience"? If I understand Proudfoot 
correctly, the following appears to be a paradigm example. On the basis of my 
own observations or the authority of others, I believe, or am disposed to believe, 
that a certain sort of pain in one's tooth is caused by cavities. Believing this, or 
being disposed to believe it, and having such a pain, I spontaneously form the 
belief that my pain is caused by a cavity. While my pain isn't noetic, the 
experience as a whole is because it incorporates a causal judgment. 
As this example indicates, noetic experiences needn't be perception-like. There 
are important differences between noetic experiences, however, and these 
shouldn't be glossed over. Proudfoot fails to distinguish three sorts of cases. (1) 
Some experiences aren't regarded by the subject as perceptions of their object 
even though a causal attribution is more or less spontaneously made. An example 
is being angered by another's actions. (2) In other cases, one may have a feelingful 
conviction of another's presence without thinking that one perceives her. Suppose 
that before somewhat apprehensively subjecting myself to an experiment in 
sensory deprivation, my wife tells me she will be present. I am blindfolded, my 
ears are stopped, and so on. I continue to be very nervous but am sustained by 
my conviction that someone who loves me is with me. (3) Finally, there are 
perception-like states such as seeing a tree or hallucinating a goblin. Each of 
these experiences incorporates a causal judgment. I spontaneously attribute my 
anger to another's behavior, my confidence to my wife's presence, and my visual 
impressions to a tree or goblin. Nevertheless, these experiences are different 
from one another. The first doesn't involve a feeling of presence, and only the 
third is perception-like. 
Why are these distinctions important? Most of us think that perception-like 
states have more cognitive value. While perceptual experiences can be delusive, 
they seem to put us in contact with reality in a way in which anger, joy, or 
convictions of presence do not. Nor is it clear that the noetic quality of perception-
like states can be equated with the incorporated causal judgment and its affective 
resonance. The "sensations," "feelings," or "impressions" (Proudfoot's terms) 
which are attributed to the causal activity of a tree or goblin (and which can be 
roughly indicated by "being appeared to treely" or "being appeared to goblinly") 
have a peculiar quality which Berkeley indicated by "outness." This quality 
doesn't clearly depend on making the appropriate causal judgment. For example, 
even if I know that I am hallucinating, it may still seem to me that a goblin is 
seated on my desk. The noetic quality of the relevant "sensations" may be 
connected with a disposition to make the appropriate causal judgment but it is 
doubtful whether "outness" can be equated with this disposition. (In my example, 
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my toothache was connected with a disposition to attribute it to a cavity. Neverthe-
less, my toothache didn't have "outness.") Nor does Proudfoot provide reasons 
for thinking that the disposition is the cause of the feeling of "outness" rather 
than the reverse. 
The relevance of these observations is, of course, this. Some religious experi-
ences are like anger or gratitude, some only involve a feelingful conviction of 
presence, and still others are perception-like. Proudfoot doesn't distinguish 
between them, and treats each as if it were simply a conjunction of sensations, 
feelings, impressions, or physiological states (a feeling of sweetness, an increased 
heartbeat, a mental image, and so on) and an interpretative hypothesis. This 
analysis is probably adequate for some religious experiences but distorts others. 
For example, it doesn't do justice to the mystic'S deliberate and systematic use 
of perceptual metaphors, or explain why they frequently distinguish their percep-
tion-like states from lower degrees of prayer which are not perception-like but 
do involve spontaneous causal attributions. 
Proudfoot's analysis is closely connected with his denial that religious experi-
ences possess intrinsic authority. He sometimes talks as if the incorporated causal 
judgment's defeasibility is sufficient to show this. If this is his view, he is 
mistaken. The fact that an experience's authority can be destroyed by showing 
that the embedded causal claim is false doesn't imply that its authority derives 
from the claim's truth. The experience's authority may spring from the "outness" 
of the sensations or impressions which the embedded claim "interprets," or from 
the fact that these claims are expressions of reliable belief producing mechanisms, 
or both. Proudfoot seems to think that an experience's authority is simply a 
function of the correctness of its embedded claim but this is like saying that the 
authority of a person's assertion is just a matter of its truth. This is often false. 
While an assertion's authority will be undermined if it turns out to be mistaken, 
it may derive from the speaker's reliability, his expertise, and so on. 
But Proudfoot's principal reason for denying that religious experiences have 
intrinsic authority lies in his conception of their nature. If a noetic experience 
is some sort of conjunction of sensations or feelings and an explanatory hypoth-
esis, and if a noetic experience's authority is identical with the truth of its 
embedded causal hypothesis, then it is difficult to see why this hypothesis should 
have more weight than others which allegedly explain the same phenomenon. 
A consequence of Proudfoot's analysis is that ordinary perceptual experiences 
have no intrinsic authority. They too consist of conjunctions of sensations or 
impressions and explanatory hypotheses. Their authority too depends upon these 
hypotheses providing the best overall explanation of the occurrence of the relevant 
impressions. Why, then, should one think that the credentials of (some) religious 
experiences are more dubious than those of ordinary perceptual experiences? 
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Although he never answers this question directly, Proudfoot clearly thinks 
that the causal judgments which are incorporated in religious experiences (and 
hence the experiences themselves) are cultural artifacts. It is fairly clear that he 
also believes that these judgments are either false or inadequately supported. He 
may, then, think that religious experiences differ from perceptual experiences 
because (1) the latter aren't just cultural artifacts and because (2) the judgments 
they incorporate are more firmly established. But (2) involves well-known circu-
larity problems, and (1) is highly contentious. 
Proudfoot appears to think that if we abstract the embedded causal hypothesis 
from a religious experience we leave nothing but accelerated heartbeats, vague 
states of arousal, feelings of sweetness, amorphous mental images, and so on. 
The experience's distinctively religious character depends on its intentionality 
and this is structured by concepts and beliefs which the subject brings to it. 
These tum out to be peculiar to the particular tradition in which the subject 
stands. Teresa's experiences are artifacts of her Christian beliefs, and the feeling 
of absolute dependence is an artifact of a culture deeply affected by theistic 
concepts. Common features only emerge at very general levels of description 
which abstract from the contribution made by the subject's tradition and therefore 
misrepresent the subject'S experience. All that religious experiences clearly have 
in common is their attribution to non-natural causes. There is, then, no significant 
common core; religious experiences are the products of culture. 
These contentions aren't adequately supported. Religious experiences are con-
ceptually structured, and most are structured by distinctively religious concepts 
and beliefs. Teresa, for example, doesn't merely perceive a loving presence, 
she perceives Christ. But the subjects of religious experience bring all their 
conceptual equipment and beliefs to their experiences, and their non-religious 
concepts and beliefs can also shape them. If Proudfoot is right, for example, 
religious experiences are structured by the concept of causality. Causality, how-
ever, isn't a peculiarly religious notion. What needs to be shown is that the 
intentional character of religious experience is entirely due to the religious con-
cepts and beliefs which the subject brings to his experience-that the more or 
less spontaneous ascription of certain states, "impressions," "feelings" or "sen-
sations'" to non-natural causes wouldn't occur in the absence of a prior commit-
ment to, or familiarity with, religious systems of interpretation. Proudfoot hasn't 
shown this and, indeed, doesn't seriously consider the possibility that human 
beings have a natural tendency to interpret certain states religiously. 
Proudfoot's account places all the explanatory weight on the interpretive sys-
tems which the subject brings to his experience. But what, then, accounts for 
the interpretive systems? After reading Proudfoot's book, I still find it more 
illuminating to suppose that religion grows out of real or apparent divine disclo-
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sures than to suppose that these disclosures are produced by religion (its beliefs, 
practices, institutions, and so on)-for the latter leaves religion inadequately 
accounted for. None of the alternative explanations (priestcraft, wish fulfillment, 
or their more sophisticated variants) seem to me as plausible as the hypothesis 
that among religion's principal causes are core experiences (or the core of certain 
experiences) which, while conceptually structured, aren't specifically Jewish or 
Buddhist or "animist," etc. Nor do I think that the peculiarities of these experi-
ences can be entirely reduced to their conceptual components or to the latter's 
affective resonance. Proudfoot's picture is unconvincing. It is as if someone 
were to claim that perceptual experiences should be largely attributed to pre-
existing systems of perceptual belief. Our perceptual beliefs and concepts do 
affect our perceptual experiences, but most of us think the explanatory relation 
primarily runs the other way. 
I have been sharply critical of a number of Proudfoot's theses. Nevertheless, 
I warmly recommend his book. Proudfoot's arguments are stimulating, clearly 
developed and, I think, significant. He has many illuminating things to say about 
a number of issues, and his analysis does fit many religious experiences. In spite 
of my disagreements with the author, I believe that Proudfoot's book should be 
read by anyone seriously interested in the issue of religious experience. 
NOTES 
I. I have in mind such things as empty consciousness, Jonathan Edwards' feelings of sweetness, 
a sense of loving presence (as distinguished from an emotionally resonant conviction that someone 
loving is present), the fusion of boundaries and sense of expansion experienced by nature mystics, 
and so on. If I am right. these things have "outness." They are typically parts of religious experiences, 
and are closely connected with their intentionality. It is doubtful whether they can be adequately 
identified without using intentional concepts. They nevertheless seem distinct from the embedded 
perceptual or causal judgments and their affective resonance. In these respects, the feelings or 
impressions in question resemble (e.g.) color "sensations." Color sensations are typically (but not 
always) parts of perceptual experiences. They are closely connected with the latter's intentionality. 
(They have "outness and, in normal subjects, their occurrence triggers a disposition to make certain 
kinds of perceptual judgments.) They too are difficult to identify without using expressions that 
allude to the relevant causal or perceptual judgments (e.g., "They are the sort of impressions or 
sensations one has when one looks at red objects"). 
